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Islamism: What it Means for the Middle East and the World, by Tarek Osman
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An incisive analysis of Islamist movements in the Middle East
A political, social, and cultural battle is currently raging in the Middle East. On one side are the Islamists, those who believe Islam should be the region’s primary identity. In opposition are nationalists, secularists, royal families, military establishments, and others who view Islamism as a serious threat to national security, historical identity, and a cohesive society.
This provocative, vitally important work explores the development of the largest, most influential Islamic groups in the Middle East over the past century. Tarek Osman examines why political Islam managed to win successive elections and how Islamist groups in various nations have responded after ascending to power. He dissects the alliances that have formed among Islamist factions and against them, addressing the important issues of Islamism’s compatibility with modernity, with the region’s experiences in the twentieth century, and its impact on social contracts and minorities. He explains what Salafism means, its evolution, and connections to jihadist groups in the Middle East. Osman speculates on what the Islamists’ prospects for the future will mean for the region and the rest of the world.
- Sales Rank: #182797 in Books
- Published on: 2016-02-23
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 9.30" h x 1.30" w x 6.50" l, .0 pounds
- Binding: Hardcover
- 328 pages
Review
“The book provides useful context as it strives to be comprehensive, considering perspectives from Turkey, Iran, Gulf countries, secularists, and non-Muslim minorities; this analysis of the interplay among various countries in the region is truly fascinating. . . . A helpful and clear introduction.”—Publishers Weekly (Publishers Weekly)
"Writing as a reporter-historian of the highest order, Osman provides a masterly overview one of the most important political currents in the world today."—Booklist, Starred Review (Booklist)
"Osman admirably captures how the gap between the vision of Islamic supremacy and the reality of Muslim subjugation has fueled in Islamist circles a mixture of anger, nostalgia, and disen¬chantment."—Foreign Affairs (Foreign Affairs)
About the Author
Tarek Osman published his prescient and internationally best-selling book Egypt on the Brink with Yale University Press weeks before Egypt’s 2011 uprising. He has appeared as a commentator on most major international news networks and is a regular contributor on the Arab world and Islamism for many leading newspapers and magazines worldwide. He wrote and presented the BBC documentary series 'The Making of the Modern Arab World' (2013) and 'Sands of Time: A History of Saudi Arabia' (2015), and is the political counsellor for the Arab world at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Tarek has sixteen years’ experience in political-economy advisory, strategy consulting and investment banking and management.
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Intelligent and Accessible Overview
By Paul
Tarek Osman is an Egyptian economist, journalist and historian of the modern middle east focused on contemporary issues and problems in that region. He has written a thoughtful and penetrating analysis of the rapid rise and decline of Political Islam/Islamism in the wake of the Arab Uprisings. He writes retrospectively ("How did we get here?") prospectively ("where might we be going?") and prescriptively ("where *should* we try to go from here?"), all against the backdrop of the political and intellectual history of the past century in the middle east. This is a lot to take on, and though his ambitions sometimes outstrip his answers, it is remarkable that he writes with such insight about these widely ranging topics. Additionally, he writes in a clear and accessible way even when he takes up aspects of intellectual history and politics that are usually discussed in academic contexts that can be forbidding to the interested lay-person. The book can be read profitably by those without any special background and serves as a fine overview.
Osman thinks that in order to understand the (mostly) unfortunate current events in the region, one must first come to terms with historical, socio-political, economic and ideological forces that have shaped not just the events of the 21st century, but also the ideas and beliefs that have become predominant in the discourse of citizens, politicians, clerics and media pundits. He seeks to understand the main causes of today's hostile conflicts over the meaning and role of such fundamental categories as the state, political participation, civil society, religion, the Ulama (community of clerics), Sharia, secularism, tolerance, and economic and social justice. He breaks the history of the modern middle east down into 3 general paradigms, each of which prevailed during a particular era over roughly the past century. In chronological order these are the ages of Liberalism, Nationalism and Islamism respectively. Of course these categories are not entirely mutually exclusive, but they are useful models to understand the predominant trends in politics and culture.
The first, the Liberal age, was characterized by increased Westernization and secularism, both cultural and political. Examples might include Kemal Attaturk's reforms in the 20's and 30s stressing popular sovereignty and secular politics and education. Another example might be the Egyptian Constitution of 1923 which adopted a parliamentary representative system, drafted by the liberal Wafd Party. The era of Western style liberal reform movements waned after the establishment of Israel in 1948, or rather after the Arab states lost the war they fought to dissolve Israel. As Arabs saw things, the Western powers supported the rights of Jewish immigrants to determine their own fate in a sovereign nation-state which displaces Arabs, yet continued to administer exploitative colonies and "mandates" in the Islamic world. Thus it seemed that the European rhetoric of equality, freedom and self-determination was empty. So went the reasoning of many disillusioned liberal Arabs. Conclusion: European models of Liberalism are not the answer. (In recent times the Liberal tradition has been reevaluated by many pro-democracy movements and secularists in the region who advocate a less Eurocentric appropriation of Liberalism.)
Thinkers and politicians then turned to Arab Nationalism, as exemplified by Nasser and later such entities as the Baath party. Political self- determination and a decisive break from the late colonial mindset were at the heart of Nationalism which was usually secular in tone. The basis of solidarity and identity in this age was "Arabness" which was to serve as an inspiration to modernize states like Egypt, Syria and Iraq while diminishing poverty and oppression. In this paradigm, all religions in the Arab world are (in theory) tolerated and none form the nucleus of collective identity. Muslims, Maronites, Jews, Druze, Copts, Shii and Sunni-- these distinctions should not be barriers to one's inclusion and participation in Arab states and society. Nasser's successful nationalization of the Suez Canal in defiance of France and Britain was seen as the high point of the Nationalist age. But despite the rhetoric, poverty was not diminished, and Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood were jailed and tortured leading to a more radical and politicized brand of Islamism. After Israel swiftly defeated Egypt, Jordan and Syria in 1967, annexing much of their territories, the Nationalist outlook lost much of its motivational sweep. Nationalist regimes tended towards dictatorships which were unresponsive to economic and social ills affecting large swathes of their populations. After 1967 it was clear that these regimes were not nearly as strong or independent as they claimed to be . They tended increasingly to become client states of great Western powers or the Soviet Union, and nationalistic pretensions were belied. Since the 70s Islamism and secularism have both grown steadily, but Islamism has grown dramatically through organizations that are increasingly well funded, and popular.
Osman maintains that the middle east is currently in the age of Islamism, which by the time of the Arab Uprisings in 2011 had reached something of a peak. By 2011, groups like the MB and Hezbollah had been embraced by many citizens who rely upon them for social services including healthcare, education, job opportunities and professional networking. Such organizations function pragmatically, and increasingly are in step with the high-tech digital age, recruiting members with a broad range of professional, technological and entrepreneurial skills. They have a great influence on media outlets and are able to get Islamist messages across on satellite TV and of course the internet. Osman explains the sociological and economic factors that led to the growth and efficiency of Islamist organizations and political parties. He then discusses the ideological and political factors that have led to their rapid decline in post "Arab Spring" countries where they recently had a firm hold on legitimate power(Mosri and the MB in Egypt and the Ennahda Party in Tunisia) but lost all of it (Egypt) or much of it (Tunisia) in the face of widespread popular resistance. Why were they rejected by large segments across the middle east and North Africa?
From the standpoint of the relatively small but influential secularists and progressives that, in large measure, kicked off the uprisings (students, intellectuals, journalists, elites), Islamists hijacked the Uprisings which were supposed to lead to greater rights and economic opportunity. They see the Islamists as even more oppressive than the military based dictatorships they replaced, and they are deeply skeptical when Islamist politicians claim to promote democracy, tolerance and equality. They point to, for example, Morsi's telling move to bypass the judiciary and grant extraordinary powers to himself using the excuse of a transitional period of crisis. Appointees in Egypt and Tunisia were largely drawn from their own Islamist parties and networks, and Sharia was sometimes touted by both of those parties. All of this belied the representative, democratic veneer of the allegedly moderate Islamists who claimed to be committed to coalition politics in which many voices including those of the liberals would be registered. Aggravating things, there have been economic downturns and not the promised growth and increased opportunities after 2011. Currently, according to Osman, the standoff between secularists and Islamists defines the situation. So does Islamism have a future? If so, is it compatible with liberal secularism?
Osman does not pretend to know the answer, but he discusses earlier "Islamists" (usually they are called Islamic Modernists) who did see just such a possibility. Such leading thinkers of the late 19th and early 20th century as Al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduuh (a prestigious cleric) thought that Islamic civilization had become stagnant, that true reform requires creative and flexible reasoning aimed at making Islam workable in the Modern world. This was a scholarly bunch, and they often pointed out that the Golden Age of Islam was made possible by the reconciliation of reason and faith among philosophers and scholars of jurisprudence (fiqh) and divine law (Sharia) in ways that enabled them to address problems not mentioned or anticipated in scripture. For many reasons, the license to think originally in jurisprudence (ijtihad) was rejected as dangerous to "genuine" or "original Islam." The works of philosophers like Avicenna were deemed heretical, and some heresies were codified as capital offenses.The modernists thought that Islam needed to recover its genuinely Islamic but creative and adaptable thinking in politics, law and education. Osman ends the book by praising their efforts and saying that in the end much will depend on whether today's Islamists become as thoughtful as these modernists, or whether they will continue to fall in line with the more extreme and rigid brand of Islamism associated with anti-Western thinkers like Sayaad Qubt who has greatly influenced militant extremists. If the former there is hope for finding common ground for secularists, Islamists and other groups including those of minority religions. If not, the conflict will likely continue to escalate.
Osman also discusses the "Turkish model" in which the originally Islamist AKP (Erdogan's "Freedom and Development Party") showed itself capable of retaining its conservative principles while playing ball with other parties and interest groups. Many Turkish liberals and secularists might disagree with this sanguine interpretation, as they are uneasy with the AKP record. But it is true that Turkey, a European state and member of Nato, has been governed by a modified Islamist party and president in recent years. Though tensions related to this likely led to the loss of Turkey's previously held temporary seat at the UN Security Council in 2014, the AKP is distinct from such groups as the MB. Osman, like Tariq Ramadan and other authors, uses the "Turkish Model" to encourage a flexible approach to Islamism-- one that might allow tolerant and modern political institutions to take root in the Middle East. He clearly sympathizes with liberal secularists on many points, but sees them as a bit insulated from the general population; a privileged group with many fine ideals but an inability to reckon with the role that religion plays in the lives of many ordinary people in their own countries. The idea of emulating the "Turkish Model" is intriguing, but it presupposes the stability of democratic or parliamentary institutions which is not a given. As I write this review, Erdogan is trying to put limits on freedom of assembly, speech and the independence of the judiciary, in the name of security, all of which is causing alarm among many outside observers and citizens in Turkey who fear a slippery slope leading to more extreme Islamism.
As far as revisiting the Islamic Modernist thinkers and reformers of the 19th century, I am not sure that it would amount to much more than an interesting diversion. I suspect that nuanced and abstruse thinkers and reformers of Islam will not play a prominent role in the unfolding, crisis-ridden situation. Multiple emergencies would seem to overshadow any interest in scholarly Islamic philosophy and deep discussions of fiqh (jurisprudence). Pragmatism is the order of the day in an age of eroding nation-states (e.g. Syria, Iraq, Libya), refugee and humanitarian crises of the greatest magnitude, the growth of large and well funded militant groups like ISIS who settle and control oil-rich provinces, deepening sectarian wars and widespread lack of access to education, healthcare, stable job opportunities, and security of life and limb for so many Arabs. The stakes are high and the window of opportunity to attenuate these problems is limited.
Overall, Osman astutely synthesizes history, journalism, economics and intellectual history making many important and illuminating connections along the way. His historical analysis is stronger than his prognosis, in my view. Still, it is hard to fault him if, like most others writing on these vexing topics, some of his answers and suggestions are vague and perhaps unrealistic. The book has more than adequate merit to compensate for that common shortcoming. I strongly recommend it both as an historical overview and a thinking person's guide to current events in the region.
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